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Abstract. Group Di±e-Hellman schemes for password-based key ex-
change are designed to provide a pool of players communicating over a
public network, and sharing just a human-memorable password, with a
session key (e.g, the key is used for multicast data integrity and con¯-
dentiality). The fundamental security goal to achieve in this scenario is
security against dictionary attacks. While solutions have been proposed
to solve this problem no formal treatment has ever been suggested. In
this paper, we de¯ne a security model and then present a protocol with
its security proof in both the random oracle model and the ideal-cipher
model.
1 Introduction
Group Di±e-Hellman schemes for password-based key exchange are designed to
provide a pool of players, communicating over a public network, and holding a
shared human-memorable password with a session key to be used to implement
secure multicast sessions. A human-memorable password pw is a (short) string
chosen from a relatively small dictionary to be easily memorized and typed-in
by a human.
Consider mission-critical applications such as emergency rescue and military
operations [18,19,21], or even commercial applications like conferencing/meeting
[1,19] and personal networking [5,13], where a (small) group of people collab-
orate. These applications operate in a highly mobile environment characterized
by the lack of any ¯xed network and security infrastructure. At the same time,
these are applications where secure multicast sessions may be needed. Due to
the absence of ¯xed infrastructure, session keys can be computed via a group
Di±e-Hellman key exchange bootstrapped from a password. A password usually
chosen by the participants may be a low-quality one (i.e. 4 decimal digits) easier
to memorize than a high-quality one (i.e. 56-bit, 192-bit).
The fundamental security goal for a group Di±e-Hellman protocol designed
for such a scenario to achieve is security against dictionary attacks. One can
not actually prevent the adversary from guessing a value for pw and using this
value in an attempt to impersonate a player. If the attack fails, the adversary498 E. Bresson, O. Chevassut and D. Pointcheval
can eliminate this value from the list of possible values for pw. However, one
would like this attack to be the only one the adversary can mount: after n active
interactions with some participants the adversary should not be able to eliminate
a greater number of passwords than n. Namely, a passive eavesdropping should
be of no help to the adversary since an o®-line exhaustive search on pw should
not get any bias on the actual password { such a bias could be later used in
on-line interactions. The o®-line exhaustive search is called dictionary attack.
Contributions. This paper represents the ¯rst formal treatment of the au-
thenticated group Di±e-Hellman key exchange problem when the parties share
a human-memorable password. We start from the model of Bresson et al. [10]
and enhance it to capture dictionary attacks. In our model, the parties are mod-
eled through oracles and the various types of attacks are modeled by queries to
these oracles. The model is equipped with the ability to obtain honest protocol
executions to enable a treatment of dictionary attacks.
Our model is used to de¯ne the execution of a password-based group Di±e-
Hellman protocol which we refer to as EKE (Encrypted Key Exchange, see [3]).
Converting a provably authenticated group Di±e-Hellman protocol [10] into a
password-based group Di±e-Hellman protocol is not an easy task. The trivial
conversion consisting in substituting a signature scheme by a symmetric encryp-
tion scheme, using the password as secret key as for the two-party case [2,7], does
not provide security against dictionary attacks. We have, in e®ect, to perform
several modi¯cations to the protocol of Bresson et al. [10]. The modi¯cations
cost only one more exponentiation per player however we also notice that the
cost of the signatures and veri¯cations is replaced by the cost of a symmetric
encryption, which is very low. The °ows are moreover shorter since there is no
longer a signature.
The security against dictionary attacks shows up in Theorem 1 which as-
serts the security of EKE in both the random oracle model and the ideal-cipher
model. Security against dictionary attacks depends on how many interactions the
adversary carries out against the instances rather than on the adversary's com-
putational power. The theorem exhibits a reduction from the semantic security
of an EKE session key to reasonable and well-de¯ned computational problems.
Our paper is organized as follows. In the remainder of this section we summa-
rize the related work. In Section 2, we de¯ne our model and the de¯nitions that
should be satis¯ed by a group Di±e-Hellman scheme secure against dictionary
attacks. In Section 3, we present the intractability assumptions we use in this
paper. We present the EKE protocol in Section 4 and assert its security in both
the random oracle model and the ideal-cipher model in Section 5. We then prove
its security in Section 6. Finally, some extensions are provided: we brie°y deal
with forward-secrecy in Section 7 and with mutual authentication in Section 8.
Related Work. Several 2-party Di±e-Hellman key exchange protocols aimed to
distribute a session key among two parties when the parties share a password.
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protocol secure in the ideal-cipher model. Our work extends their work to the
multi-party setting. Security proofs in the ideal-cipher model see a (keyed) cipher
as a family of random permutations which are queried via an oracle to encrypt
and decrypt. The oracle produces a truly random value for each new query and
identical answers if the same query is asked twice; furthermore, for each key,
the injectivity is satis¯ed. In practice, the ideal-cipher [4] is instantiated using
deterministic symmetric encryption function such as AES [17]. Although these
encryption functions have been designed with di®erent criteria from being an
ideal-cipher, AES has been designed with unpredictability in mind.
Security proofs in these two models together (both the random oracle and
the ideal-cipher models) are superior to those provided by ad-hoc protocol de-
signs although they do not provide the same security guarantees as those in the
random oracle and the standard models. However, the ideal-cipher model allows
for \elegant" and more e±cient protocols. Boyko et al. [7,15] provided (2-party)
Di±e-Hellman key exchange protocols proved secure in the random oracle model
using the multi-party simulatability technique. Katz et al. [14], and Goldreich et
al. [12] designed two-party key exchange protocols secure in the standard model.
Several papers have extended the Di±e-Hellman protocol [11] to the multi-
party setting and thus aimed to distribute a session key among parties aggregated
into a group. Bresson et al. [10] presented a formal model to securely design pro-
tocols for a scenario wherein each party holds a pair of matching public/private
keys. A logical follow up to this work is a formal model for a scenario wherein the
parties share a human-memorable password. This latter scenario was suggested
by Asokan et al. [1] as well as protocols with informal security analysis.
2 Model
In this section we de¯ne a formal model for security against dictionary attacks
where the adversary's capabilities are modeled through queries. In our model, the
players do not deviate from the protocol and the adversary is not a player. We
de¯ne the security notion that a password-based group Di±e-Hellman protocol
should achieve. In Authenticated Key Exchange (with implicit authentication),
each player is assured that an adversary not in the group is unable to learn any
information about the session key. Another important notion is mutual authen-
tication, which guarantees to each player that it actually shares a session key
with all the others.
2.1 Security Model
Players. We ¯x a nonempty set U of players that can participate in a group
Di±e-Hellman key exchange protocol P. A player Ui 2 U may have many in-
stances called oracles involved in distinct, but possibly concurrent, executions of
P. We denote by ¦t
i the t-th instance of player Ui, for any t 2 N.
The players share a low-entropy secret pw taken from a small dictionary
Password of size N. In the following, we assume that this password pw follows a
uniform distribution in the Password set.500 E. Bresson, O. Chevassut and D. Pointcheval
Abstract Interface. Let us de¯ne the basic structure of a password-based
group Di±e-Hellman protocol P. The protocol consists of two algorithms:
{ The password generation algorithm PwdGen(1`) is a probabilistic algorithm
which, on input a security parameter 1`, provides each player in U with a
common password pw uniformly distributed in Password.
{ The key exchange algorithm KeyExch(U) is an interactive multi-party pro-
tocol providing the instances of players in U, holding a common password,
with a session key sk.
Queries. The adversary A interacts with the players by making various queries.
Let us explain the capability that each query captures:
{ Execute(U): This query models passive attacks, where the adversary gets
access to honest executions of P by eavesdropping. Therefore, A gets back
the protocol °ows of an honest execution of P between the players in U.
{ Send(¦t
i;m): This query models A sending a message to an instance. The
adversary A gets back the response oracle ¦t
i generates in processing the
message m according to the protocol P. A query Send(¦t
1;\Start") initial-
izes the key exchange algorithm, and thus the adversary receives the °ow
the ¯rst player should send out to the second one.
{ Reveal(¦t
i): This query models the misuse of the session key by the players.
The query is only available to A if oracle ¦t
i holds a session key. The Reveal-
query unconditionally forces oracle ¦t
i to release sk¦t
i which is otherwise
hidden to A.
{ Test(¦t
i): This query models the semantic security of the session key sk.
The Test-query can be asked at most once by the adversary A and is only
available to A if ¦t
i is Fresh (see below). This query is answered as follows:
one °ips a coin b and forwards Reveal(¦t
i) if b = 1 or a random value if b = 0.
The Execute-query may at ¯rst seem useless since using the Send-query the
adversary has the ability to carry out honest executions of P among parties. Yet
the Execute-query is essential for properly dealing with dictionary attacks. The
number qs of Send-queries directly asked by the adversary does not take into
account the number of Execute-queries. Therefore, qs represents the number of
°ows the adversary may have built by himself, and thus the number of passwords
he would have tried.
The security notions take place in the context of executing P in the presence
of the adversary A. In this game Game
ake(A;P), A plays against the players us-
ing the above queries in order to defeat the security of P. The game is initialized
by providing coin tosses to PwdGen, A, all ¦t
i, and then
1. PwdGen is run to set the value pw of the password,
2. Initialize any ¦t
i with sk¦t
i Ã null,
3. Initialize adversary A with 1` and access to all ¦t
i,
4. Run adversary A and answer queries made by A,
5. At the end of the game, A outputs its guess b0 for the bit b involved in the
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2.2 Security Notions
Freshness. An oracle ¦t
i is Fresh (or holds a Fresh key sk) if ¦t
i has computed
a session key sk 6= null and neither ¦t
i nor one of its partners has been asked for
a Reveal-query. Intuitively, the partners of an instance ¦t
i are all the instances
that \should" hold the same session key as ¦t
i at the end of the protocol. We
give a more formal de¯nition in the full version of this paper [8].
AKE Security. In an execution of P, we say an adversary A wins if it asks
a single Test-query to a Fresh player U and correctly guesses the bit b used
in the game Game
ake(A;P). We denote the AKE advantage as Adv
ake
P (A) =
2Pr[b = b0] ¡ 1, where the probability space is over all the random coins of the
adversary and all the oracles.
3 Assumptions
Before presenting the protocol, let us remind the algorithmic assumptions on
which its security will be based on. These assumptions were shown in [9] to be
reasonable by relating them to the DDH and CDH.
Let G = hgi be a cyclic group of prime order q and n 2 N. Let In be
f1;:::;ng, P(In) be the set of all subsets of In and ¡ be any subset of P(In).
We de¯ne the Group Di±e-Hellman distribution relative to ¡ as:
GDH¡ = fD¡(x1;:::;xn) j x1;:::;xn 2R Zqg;
where
D¡(x1;:::;xn) =
n³
J;g
Q
j2J xj
´
J 2 ¡
o
:
Our protocol in this paper is based on the triangular structure Tn for ¡, we
illustrate for n = 4 on Figure 1:
Tn =
[
2·j·n
©
fij1 · i · j;i 6= kg j1 · k · j
ª
=
©
fg;f2g;f1g;f2;3g;f1;3g;f1;2g;f2;3;4g;f1;3;4g;f1;2;4g;f1;2;3g;:::
ª
:
g
g
x2 g
x1
g
x2x3 g
x1x3 g
x1x2
g
x2x3x4 g
x1x3x4 g
x1x2x4 g
x1x2x3
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Trigon Group Computational Di±e-Hellman Assumption (TG-CDH).
A (T;")-TG-CDHn-attacker for G is a probabilistic Turing machine ¢ running
in time T that given D = DTn(x1;:::;xn) 2 GDHTn outputs gx1¢¢¢xn with prob-
ability greater than ". We denote this success probability Succ
tgcdhn
G (¢).
Multi Decisional Di±e-Hellman Assumption (M-DDH). In the analysis
of the protocol EKE we need an equivalent version of the DDH assumption. Let
us de¯ne the two following distributions:
M-DHn = f(gx1;:::;gxn;grx1;:::;grxn)jx1;:::;xn;r 2R Zqg;
Randn = f(gx1;:::;gxn;gy1;:::;gyn)jx1;:::;xn;y1;:::;yn 2R Zqg:
A (T;") ¡ M-DDHn-distinguisher for G is a probabilistic Turing machine ¢
running in time T that is able to distinguish the two distributions with advantage
Adv
mddhn
G (¢) greater than ".
Lemma 1. For any group G and any integer n, Adv
mddhn
G (T) · (n¡1)Adv
ddh
G (T)
and Adv
mddhn
G (T) · Adv
ddh
G (T +(4n¡6)¿G), where ¿G is the computational time
for an exponentiation in G.
Proof. The ¯rst result easily comes using a hybrid argument [16], while the
second one uses the random self-reducibility. Indeed, from a decisional Di±e-
Hellman instance (gx2;gr1;gr2x2), where r2 = r1, one derives (with 2 exponen-
tiations performed by raising two values to the power of x1) a 4-tuple (A1 =
gx1;A2 = gx2;B1 = gr1x1;B2 = gr2x2). Then, one easily gets a 2n-tuple (A1 =
gx1;:::;An = gxn;B1 = gr1x1;:::;Bn = grnxn) where either all the ri are equal
(if r2 = r1), or the ri are independent from one another (if r2 6= r1). To this
aim, one chooses a random pair (ui;vi), and computes
Ai = A
ui
1 A
vi
2 = gx1ui+x2vi = gxi
Bi = B
ui
1 B
vi
2 = gr1x1ui+r2x2vi = gr1xi+(r2¡r1)x2vi:
u t
4 A Password-based Group Di±e-Hellman Protocol
In the following theorems and proofs we assume both the random oracle model
and the ideal-cipher model, and the arithmetic is in a ¯nite cyclic group G = hgi
of order a `1-bit prime number q, where the operation is denoted multiplicatively.
More precisely, we consider ¹ G = Gnf1g. It has the particularity that for any
h 2 ¹ G, ¹ G = fhr jr 2 f1;:::;q ¡ 1gg, but it is no longer a group.
We then use a hash function H from f0;1g¤ to f0;1g`2 and consider several
block ciphers, depending on the size of the input: for each integer i ¸ 2, we
de¯ne two families Ei = fEi
kg and E0i = fE0i
kg of keyed permutations over ¹ Gi,
where k 2 Password. The inverse of Ei
k (resp. E0i
k) is denoted Di
k (resp. D0i
k).Group Di±e-Hellman Key Exchange Secure Against Dictionary Attacks 503
U1 U2 ::: Un
x1
R Ã [1;q ¡ 1] x2
R Ã [1;q ¡ 1] xn
R Ã [1;q ¡ 1]
X0 = fg0g
º1
R Ã [1;q ¡ 1]
X1 := ©(X0;x1;º1)
Fl1 := Epw(X1)
Fl1 ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ !
X1 := Dpw(Fl1)
º2
R Ã [1;q ¡ 1]
X2 := ©(X1;x2;º2)
Fl2 := Epw(X2)
Fl2 ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ !
:::
Fln¡1
¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ !
Xn¡1 := Dpw(Fln¡1)
ºn
R Ã [1;q ¡ 1]
X
0
n := ©
0(Xn¡1;xn;ºn)
Fln := E
0
pw(X
0
n)
Fln Ã ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡
:::
Fln Ã ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡
Fln Ã ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡
Each player gets X
0
n := D
0
pw(Fln) = f®1;:::;®ng
and K = (®i)
xi = g
x1:::xn
n ;where gn = g
º1:::ºn
0
©(f¯1;:::;¯i¡1;¯g;x;º)
= f¯
ºx
1 ;:::;¯
ºx
i¡1;¯
º;¯
ºxg 2 ¹ G
i+1:
©
0(f¯1;:::;¯i¡1;¯g;x;º)
= f¯
ºx
1 ;:::;¯
ºx
i¡1;¯
ºg 2 ¹ G
i:
Fig.2. Protocol EKE. The multicast group is U = fU1;U2;:::;Ung and the session
key is sk = H(UkFlnkK).
In practice, such encryption schemes are instantiated with CBC mode so
that each part of the plaintext depends on the entire ciphertext. Following this
idea, we (abusively) denote Ek(X) (resp. E0
k(X)) the encryption of a plaintext
X 2 ¹ Gi for some i under key k using Ei
k (resp. E0i
k) without explicitly specifying
the length of X.
4.1 Algorithm
As illustrated on Figure 2, the protocol EKE consists of a set of players arranged
in a ring and the °ows are encrypted under the password pw. The session-
key space SK associated to this protocol is f0;1g`2 equipped with a uniform
distribution. Moreover, EKE consists of two stages: several up-°ows (which are
encrypted using E) and the down-°ow (which is encrypted using E0).
In the up-°ow, player Ui (for 1 · i < n) receives a ciphertext Fli¡1 2 ¹ Gi
and decrypts it using Dpw into the plaintext Xi¡1 2 ¹ Gi (by convention, U1
just receives Fl0 = \Start", and thus builds X0 = fg0g, where g0 is a random
element in ¹ G). Player Ui then generates at random two (private) values (xi;ºi)
in Z?
q and gets Xi := ©(Xi¡1;xi;ºi) 2 ¹ Gi+1 by processing the plaintext Xi¡1504 E. Bresson, O. Chevassut and D. Pointcheval
according to the operator © (described below). Player Ui ¯nally encrypts the
value Xi using Epw and forwards the ciphertext Fli to the next player in the
ring.
The down-°ow takes place when player Un receives the last up-°ow Fln¡1 2
¹ Gn. It decrypts it using Dpw into the plaintext Xn¡1 2 ¹ Gn. It then generates at
random two (private) values (xn;ºn) in Z?
q and gets X0
n := ©0(Xn¡1;xn;ºn) 2 ¹ Gn
by processing the plaintext Xn¡1 according to the operator ©0 (described below).
Player Un ¯nally encrypts the value X0
n using E0
pw and broadcasts the ciphertext
Fln.
Finally, each player can compute the session key sk = H(UkFlnkK), where
K = (g
º1¢¢¢ºn
0 )
x1¢¢¢xn. Indeed, if everything worked correctly, player Ui can com-
pute K by decrypting the broadcast Fln using D0
pw into X0
n 2 ¹ Gn and raising
the i-th term ®i of X0
n to the power of its private exponent xi.
4.2 Operators © and ©0
We now describe the operators © and ©0, and see that ¯nally all the players agree
on the same value K. The operator © takes as inputs a set f¯1;:::;¯i¡1;¯g 2 ¹ Gi,
for some i, a private exponent x 2 Z?
q and a blinding exponent º 2 Z?
q. Then,
©(f¯1;:::;¯i¡1;¯g;x;º) = f¯ºx
1 ;:::;¯ºx
i¡1;¯º;¯ºxg 2 ¹ Gi+1:
The operator ©0 does exactly the same transformation but returns the i ¯rst
elements only:
©0(f¯1;:::;¯i¡1;¯g;x;º) = f¯ºx
1 ;:::;¯ºx
i¡1;¯ºg 2 ¹ Gi:
Therefore, if all the computations are performed correctly, the °ows between
4 players include the plaintexts X1, X2 and X3 presented on Figure 3. The
plaintext X0
4 is the 4 ¯rst elements of X4 only while the last element of X4 is
K = (g
º1º2º3º4
0 )
x1x2x3x4 = g
x1x2x3x4
4 .
g0 = X0
g1 g
x1
1 = X1 = ©(X0;x1;º1)
g
x2
2 g
x1
2 g
x1x2
2 = X2 = ©(X1;x2;º2)
g
x2x3
3 g
x1x3
3 g
x1x2
3 g
x1x2x3
3 = X3 = ©(X2;x3;º3)
g
x2x3x4
4 g
x1x3x4
4 g
x1x2x4
4 g
x1x2x3
4 g
x1x2x3x4
4 = X4 = ©(X3;x4;º4)
Fig.3. Honest execution, when n = 4. We denote ºi = loggi¡1(gi).
One can indeed check by induction that the j-th element of Xi is (g
¹i
0 )
yi=xj =
g
yi=xj
i , where ¹i = º1 ¢¢¢ºi mod q, gi = g
¹i
0 and yi = x1 ¢¢¢xi mod q. Therefore,Group Di±e-Hellman Key Exchange Secure Against Dictionary Attacks 505
the i-th element ®i of the down-°ow is g
yn=xi
n which with the knowledge of xi
leads to the common value K = ®
xi
i = gyn
n .
4.3 Dictionary Attacks
In EKE, we have to be careful of the content in the ciphertext since any redun-
dancy in the concatenation of the plaintexts in the °ows of the protocol could be
used by the adversary to mount a dictionary attack. The adversary could decrypt
°ows using all the passwords in the dictionary and look for this redundancy.
Namely, the trivial conversion wherein one substitutes in a group Di±e-
Hellman protocol [10] the signature scheme by a symmetric encryption scheme
is easily seen insecure, while it works in the two-party case. This conversion
indeed produces a protocol in which all the computations are performed with
ºi = 1, for all i; therefore the last element of each plaintext in Fli also belongs
to the plaintext in Fli+1.
5 Security Result
In this section we assert that under reasonable and well-de¯ned intractability
assumptions the protocol EKE securely distributes session keys. We deal with
the AKE goal only and thus do not consider forward-secrecy here. However,
concurrent executions are possible.
Theorem 1. Let P be the EKE protocol, SK be the session-key space and
Password be a ¯nite dictionary of size N. Let A be an adversary against the
AKE security of P within a time bound T, after qs interactions with the parties,
qh hash-queries, and qe encryption/decryption queries. Then we have:
Adv
ake
P (A) ·
2qs
N
+ 2qsAdv
mddhn
G (T 0) + 2qhSucc
tgcdhn
G (T 0) +
2Q2
q2
where T 0 · T + nQ¿G, Q = 3qs + qe and ¿G is the computational time for an
exponentiation in G. (Recall that q is the order of G).
This theorem shows that EKE is secure against dictionary attacks since the
advantage of the adversary essentially grows with the ratio of interactions (num-
ber of Send-queries) to the number of passwords. This is particularly signi¯cant
in practice since a password may expire once a number of failed interactions
has been achieved, whereas the adversary's capability to enumerate passwords
o®-line is only limited by its computational power.
Of course, the security results only holds provided that the adversary does
not solve either the trigon group computational problem TG-CDH or the multi-
decisional Di±e-Hellman problem M-DDH. But these terms can be made negli-
gible by appropriate choice of parameters for the group G.506 E. Bresson, O. Chevassut and D. Pointcheval
6 Proof of Security
In this section we show that the protocol EKE achieves security against dictio-
nary attacks as claimed by Theorem 1. We ¯rst introduce the notations we will
use and then prove that the best the adversary can do is to essentially eliminate
one password from the dictionary per initiated session (maybe concurrently).
Here, we present a proof that does not yet deal with forward-secrecy. All the
lemmas are proven in the full version of this paper [8].
6.1 Operator ª
As illustrated in Figure 2, each player Ui generates a new basis when processing
an up-°ow by raising the values it received to the power of its random blinding
exponent ºi. But let us notice that given a TG-CDH instance of size n, with the
TG-CDH-solution, one can easily derivate the trigon whose lines are the °ows
sent during an honest execution of EKE, by raising the lines to the power of
random and independent exponents.
We denote by µ a n-tuple of elements in Z?
q, by µi the i-th component of µ,
and by [g]n the n-tuple (g;:::;g). For any line L of length i+1, the operator ª
takes as input a n-tuple µ, a random exponent º and applies a (multiplicative)
self-reduction of the line L as follows:
- [Using µ] ¯rst, one raises the ¯rst i elements of L to the power of £i=µ1,
..., £i=µi respectively, and the last element to the power of £i, where £i =
µ1 ¢¢¢µi;
- [Change of basis] then, one raises all the elements of the tuple to the power
º.
For example, from a line L = (g1;:::;gi+1), with any tuple µ and º, one gets
ª(L;µ;º) = (g
º£i=µ1
1 ;:::;g
º£i=µi
i ;g
º£i
i+1);
where £i = µ1 ¢¢¢µi. A line L of form fgyi=x1;:::;gyi=xi;gyig where yi = x1 ¢¢¢xi
is thus represented as follows:
L = ª([g]i+1;(x1;:::;xi;1;:::;1);1) 2 ¹ Gi+1:
The following lemmas exhibit some useful results about the operators © and ª:
Lemma 2 (Equality of distributions). Let g 2 ¹ G and L = fg®0;:::;g®ig 2
¹ Gi+1. The following two distributions are perfectly indistinguishable:
n
ª
¡
L;µ;º
¢o
(µ;º)2(Z?
q)n+1 and
n
gr0;:::;gri
o
(r0;:::;ri)2(Z?
q)i+1Group Di±e-Hellman Key Exchange Secure Against Dictionary Attacks 507
Lemma 3 (Commutativity and composition). Let x;º;º0 2 Z?
q and µ;µ0 2
(Z?
q)n. For any line L 2 ¹ Gi, we have (where µµ0 is the component-wise multipli-
cation of the vectors µ and µ0):
ª
¡
©(L;x;º);µ;º0¢
= ©
¡
ª(L;µ;º0);xµi;º
¢
;
ª
¡
ª(L;µ;º);µ0;º0¢
= ª(L;µµ0;ºº0);
ª
¡
©(L;x;º);[1]n;º0¢
= ©(L;x;ºº0);
if (8j < i;µj = µ0
j);ª(L;µ;º) = ª(L;µ0;º):
6.2 Proof of Theorem 1
In this section we incrementally de¯ne a sequence of games starting at the real
game G0 and ending up at G6. We let b and b0 be de¯ned as in Section 2.1 and
refer to Si as the event b = b0 in game Gi. We also de¯ne the event Encrypti as
the event that a °ow has been encrypted, but not decrypted ¯rst (see below), by
the adversary under pw (with any symmetric encryption scheme E or E0). We
use the following lemma within our sequence of games [20]:
Lemma 4. Let E;E0 and F;F 0 be some events de¯ned on a probability space.
Let us assume that Pr[F] = Pr[F 0] = " and Pr[E ^ :F] = Pr[E0 ^ :F 0]. Then, ¯ ¯Pr[E] ¡ Pr[E0]
¯ ¯ · ".
Game G0: This is the real attack Game
ake(A;P) in which several oracles are
available to the adversary: a hash oracle, the encryption/decryption oracles, and
all the instances of players (in order to cover concurrent executions).
Rule 1: The instances of players process each Send-query with a
pair of random exponents (xi;ºi), using the operators © and ©0.
Thus, the instances of players can easily answer to the Reveal-query and the
Test-query. The Execute-query is proceeded similarly. By de¯nition, Pr[S0] =
(Adv
ake
P (A) + 1)=2.
Game G1: We simulate the hash and the encryption/decryption oracles as in
G0 by maintaining ¯ve lists: a hash list (¤H), encryption lists (¤E, ¤0
E) and
decryption lists (¤D, ¤0
D). The lists are initially empty. We denote by qH the
size of ¤H, and by qE the number of encryption-decryption relations: i.e. qE is
the size of ¤E [ ¤0
E. The queries are answered as follows:
{ Hash-query: For a query q such that a record (q;r) appears in ¤H, the answer
is r. Otherwise r is chosen at random from f0;1g`2 and the record (q;r) is
added to ¤H. We have H(q) = r.
{ Encryption-query: For an encryption query (k;X) to E (resp. E0) such that a
record (¤;k;X;Y ) appears in ¤E (resp., ¤0
E) the answer is Y . Otherwise Y
is a random ciphertext of length jXj. The record (±;k;X;Y ) is then added
to encryption list ¤E (resp. ¤0
E). ± 2 f0;1g is a bit indicating the originator
of the query: if the query comes from the simulator then ± = 0 else the query
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{ Decryption-query: For a decryption query (k;Y ) to D (resp. D0) such that a
record (¤;k;X;Y ) appears in ¤E (resp. ¤0
E), the answer is X. Otherwise X
is generated by the following rule:
Rule 2: X is a random tuple fgrig1·i·jY j where r1;:::;rjY j are
randomly drawn in Z?
q.
The record (k;Y;X) is then added to the decryption list ¤D (resp. ¤0
D) while
the record (0;k;X;Y ) is added to the encryption list ¤E (resp. ¤0
E).
We notice that a decryption-query adds a record to both the encryption and
the decryption lists, while an encryption-query adds a record to the encryption
list only. In both cases, a later encryption or decryption query on the same
elements does not add any record to any list. Hence, a record (k;Y;X) appears
in the decryption list if and only if the decryption query (k;Y ) has been asked
¯rst (i.e., before the corresponding encryption query).
With this de¯nition, Encrypti is de¯ned in game Gi as the event that there
exists a record (1;pw;X;Y ) in an encryption list, such that Y has been submitted
in a Send-query. Note that this implies that the corresponding record (pw;Y;X)
does not appear in any decryption list.
>From the above simulation we easily see that the games G1 and G0 are
perfectly indistinguishable, unless the permutation property of the block ciphers
does not hold. One could have avoided collisions in the above simulation but
this is at most q2
E=2(q ¡ 1)2 since the smallest set for the encryption functions
is j¹ G2j = (q ¡ 1)2:
j Pr[S1] ¡ Pr[S0]j ·
q2
E
2(q ¡ 1)2 ·
q2
E
q2 : (1)
Game G2: We delete the executions wherein the adversary may have guessed
the password. More formally, we delete the executions wherein event Encrypt1
occurs: i.e. a Send(¦;Y )-query is asked and a record of the form (1;pw;¤;Y )
appears in an encryption list. In these executions, we stop setting b0 at random:
j Pr[S2] ¡ Pr[S1]j · Pr[Encrypt1]: (2)
Game G3: We simulate the instances of players from a tuple (x1;:::;xn). This
tuple allows us to compute an instance D = D(x1;:::;xn) of the TG-CDHn with
its solution gx1¢¢¢xn. We use D to construct using blinding exponents º1;:::;ºn
the triangular structure illustrated in Figure 3 where all the bases are random-
ized. The lines of this structure will be used in this game to answer to the
Send-queries. The lines of this triangular structure are denoted and constructed
as
Li =
½
fgg if i = 0,
©(Li¡1;xi;ºi) if 1 · i · n,
where the n + 1-th element · of Ln is · = gx1¢¢¢xn
n =
¡
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We now show how to use these lines to simulate the instances of players.
We ¯rst maintain a list ¤ª that keeps track of the exponents µ used to blind
a line Li: L = ª(Li;µ;º). This list contains records of the form (i;µ;º;L) and
is initially set to f(0;[1]n;1;fgg)g. Then, we answer to a Send(¦t
i;Fl)-query as
follows:
{ ¦t
i is waiting for an up-°ow: if the length of Fl is di®erent from i, then we
do not do anything. Otherwise we do perform the following two steps.
1. if i = 1 then one sets L = fgg, else one invokes the decryption oracle to
get L = Dpw(Fl).
2. one computes line L0 according to Rule 1.1 and encrypts some elements
of L0. If i < n, then the whole line L0 is encrypted into Epw(L0). Other-
wise, if i = n, then only the n ¯rst elements of L0, we refer to them as
L00, are encrypted using E0
pw. Finally, ¦t
i waits for the down-°ow.
Rule 1.1: We ¯rst chooses two random exponents (½t
i;¹t
i) 2 (Z?
q)2. If
(i¡1;µ;º;L) 2 ¤ª for some µ;º, then we compute L0 = ª(Li;µ0;¹t
iº)
where µ0 is de¯ned to µ except that µ0
i = ½t
i, and we update the list
¤ª. Otherwise one applies the Rule 1.1' presented below.
Rule 1.1': One still uses Rule 1, but with (xi½t
i;ºi¹t
i) instead of
(xi;ºi).
The random ½t
i is di®erent each time one answers this °ow (either by
Rule 1.1 or Rule 1.1'.) Indeed, the same °ow Fl may be sent several
times by the adversary in di®erent and concurrent executions.
By induction, one easily show that any line L either comes from Rule 2 or,
under :Encrypt, from a previous Rule 1.1.
{ ¦t
i is waiting for a down-°ow: if the length of Fl is di®erent from n, then we
do not do anything. Otherwise, we invoke the decryption oracle D0
pw(Fl) to
obtain L00 or more speci¯cally to obtain the i-th element ®t
i in L00:
Rule 3: For any ¦t
i, Kt
i is set to be (®t
i)xi½
t
i, where ®t
i is the i-th
element in the down-°ow L00 received by ¦t
i.
We have now to show that the © relation between the lines Li¡1 and Li is
\preserved" by the ª transformation. The following lemma shows it: two lines
Li¡1;Li of the triangular structure already related by the operator © are still
related by © after having respectively been transformed into L;L0 by the operator
ª.
Lemma 5. L0 = ©(L;xi½t
i;¹t
iºi).
By Lemma 5, our simulation simply makes the player choose as private exponent
xi½t
i and as blinding exponent ºi¹t
i (both values are uniformly distributed be-
cause ¹t
i and ½t
i are). From the value Kt
i, we can then easily compute the session
key sk¦t
i to be H(UkFlnkKt
i).
It follows that games G2 and G3 are perfectly indistinguishable:
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Game G4: We now modify the way the decryption queries are simulated by
modifying the Rule 2, in order to embed the instance D in the answers output
by the decryption oracle, so that an attack may help us to solve it.
Rule 2.1: One chooses a random blinding exponent º 2 Z?
q and
random exponents µ in (Z?
q)n. If Y is a query to Dpw, then X is set
to ª(Li;µ;º), where i = jY j¡1. If Y is a query to D0
pw, and jY j = n,
then X0 is set to ª(Ln;µ;º), but X is set to the n ¯rst elements of
X0. In both cases, the list ¤ª is updated.
From Lemma 2, with random µ and º, all the answers X are perfectly random
in ¹ GjY j:
Pr[S4] = Pr[S3]: (4)
Before going further on, let us claim the following lemma. It shows that from
now on, Rule 1.1' will not be used anymore.
Lemma 6. If one assumes :Encrypt4 in game G4, any plaintext L included in a
°ow received via a Send-query is recorded in ¤ª (possibly with one more element
if L has been decrypted by D0
pw, and thus corresponds to a down-°ow).
Game G5: In the above game G4, one can remark that knowledge of the xi's
is not needed, one could only be given an instance D = D(x1;:::;xn) of the
TG-CDHn with its solution gx1¢¢¢xn only.
But while the xi's are not needed to construct the triangular structure fL0,
...,Lng, the xi's are needed to compute Kt
i. This value is in turn used to compute
the session key sk¦t
i and therefore needed to answer to the Reveal-query and
Test-query. Thus, if we want to avoid the use of the xi's, we need to ¯nd another
way to compute Kt
i.
Fortunately, it is possible: according to Lemma 6, if Encrypt4 did not occur
then the up°ow L0 = ©(L;xi½t
i;ºi¹t
i) has been generated by the Rule 1.1 with
as input of L = ª(Li¡1;µ;º). Let us recall that L00 corresponds to the n ¯rst
elements of the tuple ª(Ln;µ0;º0), · = gx1¢¢¢xn is the last component of Ln
and £0 is equal to the product µ0
1 ¢¢¢µ0
n. We can now compute Kt
i by modifying
Rule 3 to be:
Rule 3.1: Kt
i = ·º
0£
0¢½
t
i=µ
0
i. And then, the session keys can been
computed without the xi's.
Lemma 7. Rule 3 and Rule 3.1 lead to the same result.
By Lemma 7, the games G4 and G5 are perfectly indistinguishable, as soon as
Encrypt5 does not occur.
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Game G6. Finally, we are just given an instance D = D(x1;:::;xn) of the
TG-CDHn without its solution gx1¢¢¢xn. Then, if the adversary helps us to get
some Kt
i, we have solved the TG-CDHn problem (and we are done, see the
Lemma 8 below).
However, since we do not know ·, we can no longer compute Kt
i and can not
therefore answer to Reveal-oracles (and the Test-query). We simply simulate the
Reveal-oracles (even for a Test-query), by answering a random value, without
asking the hash oracle H.
Let us denote by AskH the event that A makes a hash-query of the form
(UkFlnkKt
i), where Fln is the down-°ow received by any ¦t
i. Unless neither
AskH occurs (nor Encrypt5) games G5 and G6 are perfectly indistinguishable:
Pr[S6 j:AskH] = Pr[S5 j:AskH]: (6)
The probability of event AskH is upper-bounded in the following lemma. Let us
recall that qh denotes the number of hash-queries asked by the adversary.
Lemma 8. Pr[AskH] · qhSucc
tgcdhn
G (T + (qs + qE)n¿G).
In this game, answers to the Reveal-queries, and thus to the Test-query, are
purely random. Then, it is straightforward to see that
Pr[S6] =
1
2
: (7)
From Lemma 4 and Equations (6), (7), we get:
¯ ¯ ¯Pr[S5] ¡
1
2
¯ ¯ ¯ =
¯ ¯ ¯Pr[S5] ¡ Pr[S6]
¯ ¯ ¯ · Pr[AskH]:
Finally, from Equations (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5), and Lemmas 4, 8, we get:
¯ ¯ ¯Pr[S0] ¡
1
2
¯ ¯ ¯ · Pr[Encrypt1] +
q2
E
q2 + qhSucc
tgcdhn
G (T + (qs + qE)n¿G): (8)
6.3 Probability of Event Encrypt1
The security against dictionary attacks is measured by the probability that the
event Encrypt1 occurs. To evaluate this probability, we de¯ne a game wherein
the view of the adversary is perfectly independent from the password pw, in the
information theoretical sense. First, let us note that the games G2, G3, G4 and
G5 are perfectly indistinguishable, and thus
Pr[Encrypt5] = Pr[Encrypt1]: (9)
We de¯ne an auxiliary game G00
6 similar to game G5 except that we answer
di®erently to a Send(¦t
i;Fl)-query when instance ¦t
i is waiting for an up-°ow.
In this game G00
6, we in fact re-de¯ne all coe±cients used by the random self-
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Rule 1.2: Whatever appears in ¤ª so far, we choose a random ex-
ponent º 2 Z?
q, a full vector µ 2 (Z?
q)n and compute L0 = ª(Li;µ;º).
We then update ¤ª.
By Lemma 2, the plaintext L0 is indistinguishable from a random plaintext in
¹ Gi+1 and, therefore, the simulation is completely independent from the password
pw. So we have
Pr[Encrypt
00
6] = qs=N: (10)
Moreover the only di®erence between games G00
6 and G5 is in the way the
Send-queries are answered. On input of a line L = (a1;:::;ai¡1;ai), the Rule 1.1
generates line L0 = (aºx
1 ;:::;aºx
i¡1;aº
i ;aºx
i ) while the Rule 1.2 generates L00 =
(gr0;:::;gri). Using the classical hybrid technique we can obtain:
¯ ¯Pr[Encrypt
00
6] ¡ Pr[Encrypt5]
¯ ¯ · qs Adv
mddhn
G (T + (qs + qE)n¿G): (11)
Finally, Equations (9), (10) and (11) lead to
Pr[Encrypt1] ·
qs
N
+ qsAdv
mddhn
G (T + (qs + qE)n¿G):
Note that qE is the size of ¤E [ ¤0
E and it is thus equal to qe plus the number
of queries asked by our simulation (at most two per Send-query): qE · qe +2qs.
This note, combined with Equation (8), concludes the proof. u t
7 Forward-Secrecy
The above proof does not deal with forward-secrecy. Considering forward-secrecy
requires to take into account a new kind of query that we call the Corrupt-query
(any other kinds of queries can still be asked after this one):
{ Corrupt(U): This query models the attacks resulting in the password pw to
be revealed. A gets back from his query pw but does not get any internal
data of U.
Then we de¯ne a new °avor of freshness, saying that an oracle ¦t
i is Fresh
(or holds a Fresh key sk) if the following conditions hold. First, no Corrupt-
query has been made by the adversary since the beginning of the game. Second,
¦t
i has computed a session key and neither ¦t
i nor its partners have been asked
for a Reveal-query. The partnering notion is more formally de¯ned in the full
version of this paper [8].
This security level means that the adversary does not learn any information
about previously established session keys when making a Corrupt-query. We thus
denote by Adv
akefs
P (A) the advantage an adversary can get on a fresh key, with
the ability to make a Corrupt-query.
Theorem 2. Let P be the EKE protocol, SK be the session-key space and
Password be a ¯nite dictionary of size N. Let A be an adversary against the
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qh hash-queries, and qe encryption/decryption queries. Then, there exists k · n
such that:
Adv
akefs
P (A) ·
2qs
N
+ 2qsAdv
mddhn
G (T 0) + 2n2qn
s qhSucc
tgcdhk
G (T 0) +
2Q2
q2 :
where T 0 · T + Qn¿G, Q = 5qs + qe and ¿G is the time of computation required
for an exponentiation in G. (Recall that q is the order of G).
Proof. The proof of this theorem is given in the full version of this paper [8].
8 Mutual Authentication
The well-known approach for turning an Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE)
protocol into a protocol that provides mutual authentication (MA) is to use the
shared session key to construct a simple \authenticator" for the other parties.
In [10], we already described the transformation, and justi¯ed its security in the
random-oracle model. The ¯rst analysis has been done before in the two-party
case in [2].
9 Conclusion
This paper provides the ¯rst formal treatment of the authenticated group Di±e-
Hellman key exchange problem that encompasses dictionary attacks. Addressed
in this paper are two security goals of the group Di±e-Hellman key exchange: the
authenticated key exchange and the mutual authentication. For each we present
a de¯nition, a protocol and a security proof in both the random oracle model
and the ideal-cipher model that the protocol meets its goals. Furthermore, we
consider forward-secrecy, even if the reduction is not very e±cient. Reducing
the ideal-cipher model assumption and improving the reduction for the forward-
secrecy are still open problems.
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